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Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.  
Horace, Odes (III.2.13) 
Warfare is as old as mankind. To survive, groups of humans needed the ability to defend 
themselves since time immemorial. Anthropologists have long highlighted the puzzling 
nature of “parochial altruism”, the willingness to fight for one’s own group (Bowles and 
Gintis 2004; Choi and Bowles 2007). If fighting benefits the group but is individually 
costly, how do groups convince their members that it is “sweet and honorable” to die for 
the community? In small tribes, the problem is typically solved through social pressure. 
In contrast, it is much harder for large, modern societies to motivate individuals to fight 
for the common good. The problem reached new dimensions after 1800, when army sizes 
expanded and warfare changed from the "game of princes" to total war — an all-
encompassing effort that required complete dedication by all segments of society in order 
to succeed (Kennedy, 2004). As the German general Carl von Clausewitz (1832) 
observed: "War became the business of the people."  
The rise of mass armies coincided with the coming of the social welfare state. Since the 
late 19th century, governments have added old age pensions, health care, and education to 
their primary tasks. Some of this expansion took place during wartime: governments have 
often made lavish promises of creating "homes fit for heroes", by expanding the welfare 
state after victory. A recent theoretical literature argues that the need for motivated 
soldiers and more manpower led to the big expansion of the welfare state, together with 
massive attempts by governments to spread nationalist ideology (Alesina and Reich 2013; 
Alesina et al. 2017).1 While there are good reasons to assume that welfare states were 
useful in convincing citizens to fight, there is so far no systematic empirical evidence 
demonstrating a direct link.  
In this paper, we examine empirically whether there is a strong, causal connection 
between welfare and warfare. We do so for the case of the United States before and 
during World War II. Prior to 1933, U.S. welfare spending was very limited. Under 
President Roosevelt's "New Deal", this changed dramatically: The Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration started offering grants to farmer in distress in 1933; two years 
later, the Social Security Act extended support to the unemployed, the elderly, and single 
mothers. In the same year, the President also launched the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA), a Federal agency which became the largest employer in the US, 
paying millions of men to undertake public works. For the first time in American history, 
the federal government became a highly visible source of everyday support for millions 
of citizens (Fishback et al., 2005).  
                                                          
1 Relatedly, some have argued that universal education was introduced because it was seen as helping a 
nation’s military efforts (Aghion et al. 2016). 
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After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States entered World War II against 
the Axis Powers. For four years, the war absorbed a large share of the country’s 
resources, and ordinary citizens contributed to the effort in several ways. Those who 
remained home financed the war with their savings, and often found employment in 
sectors engaged in war production. Many men and women joined the army: between 
1941 and 1945 almost 17.9 million people served in one of the branches of the U.S. 
military, and 39% of these people did so voluntarily.2 Although few soldiers saw active 
combat (Hastings, 1999), some of those who did, went on to perform heroic actions, 
recognized with citations and medals. 
In this paper, we ask whether areas that received more support under New Deal during 
the 1930s supported the war effort more enthusiastically after 1941. We use three costly 
actions to measure commitment to the national cause. First, purchases of war bonds, 
which required sacrificing part of current consumption. Second, we use individual-level 
data on the geographical origin of volunteers. Third, we collect information on the 
recipients of military awards, and use it to measure the spatial distribution of war 
‘heroes.’ These people typically performed very costly actions, well beyond the call of 
duty. While many factors affect heroism on the battlefield, we use them as an indicator of 
patriotic sentiment. 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic patterns in the data. We plot county-level value of relief 
grants per capita (on the x-axis) against the three measures of patriotic support (on the y-
axis). The left panel shows the per capita value of war bond purchases; the middle panel 
shows the share of volunteers among army registrants; the right panel, the number of 
military awards per 1,000 army registrants. For each of these measures of patriotism, the 
raw data reveal a strong and positive correlation with the level of New Deal support 
before World War II. In the empirical section we show that these correlations survive the 
inclusion of a rich set of controls. 
Next, we focus on one specific component of the New Deal program, and present 
evidence that supports a causal link between welfare relief and patriotic sentiment. 
Starting in 1933, the Federal Agriculture Adjustment Administration (AAA) extended 
grants to farmers in distress. The program was one of the first and biggest New Deal 
projects, representing 13.5 percent of total New Deal spending. It was also highly visible 
among farmers, a category that was hit hard by the Great Depression. For identification, 
we exploit the fact that a significant portion of AAA grants were made in response to 
local weather shocks, especially droughts. We show that New Deal-era drought is a 
strong predictor of AAA payments. There is also a clear reduced form relationship 
between droughts and patriotism during World War II, as measured by war bond 
                                                          
2 The share of volunteers was even higher during the first months of the war: by November 1942, 
approximately 3 million men had signed up voluntarily, corresponding to about 46% of the military 
strength (SSS 1943, p.16). 
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purchases, volunteering rates and share of army heroes. Two-stage least squares estimates 
confirm the existence of a strong, positive relationship between agricultural relief and 
patriotism. 
We validate the causal interpretation of our estimates in a number of ways. First, we 
argue that the strong positive relationship between droughts and all three measures of 
patriotism is hard to explain with economic incentives. More intense droughts in the 
1930s may cause worse economic conditions in the 1940s and offer reasons to leave and 
join the army. Even though drought-induced economic distress may explain a higher rate 
of volunteering, this mechanism is hard to reconcile with our two other results: the higher 
likelihood of becoming a war hero and especially the larger purchase of war bonds. Given 
the diverse nature of our measure of patriotism, we take the full set of results as strong 
evidence of the mechanism we propose. Second, we find no significant correlation 
between pre-New Deal era droughts and patriotic sentiment. While severe droughts hit 
different parts of the United States in the years before 1933, until the New Deal they were 
never met with public relief. We interpret the absence of correlation between pre-New 
Deal droughts and patriotic support as evidence that post-1933 weather shocks did not 
matter per se, but because they induced a public response. Third, we use recorded 
occupation of enlisted men to show that our results on volunteering are strongest among 
farmers. This result is consistent with the idea that farmers reciprocated – the public relief 
they received during difficult times led to greater volunteering when their nation was in 
peril. Finally, we collect the distribution of volunteers and war hero during World War I, 
and show that agricultural support did not correlate significantly with pre-existing 
patriotic sentiments. 
A battery of robustness tests confirms the strength of our findings. First, we obtain all 
results when we re-estimate our regressions with entropy balancing and with nearest 
neighbor matching. Second, we apply Conley et al. (2012) methodology, and verify that 
our two-stages least squares estimates are robust to violations of the exclusion restriction. 
We find that the direct effects of post-1933 droughts on patriotism should be more than 
half the size of the indirect effect through welfare support. Given the near-0 correlation 
between pre-1933 droughts and patriotism, we believe that direct effects of this size are 
unlikely. Finally, we experiment with a number of alternative measures of patriotism, as 
well as with specifications with state fixed effects, and always find a robust, positive 
effect of welfare support on patriotism.  
We believe that the case of the US provides an ideal testing ground for the welfare-to-
warfare nexus. First, the New Deal represents the largest and most prominent example of 
public sector expansion in the history of the United States. It consisted of a set of 
programs that were explicitly intended to provide assistance to citizens in distress, a type 
of policy that has the potential to promote inclusion and gratitude among its beneficiaries. 
Second, the New Deal started almost 10 years before the United States entered World 
War II. This allows to measure the patriotic response to public spending at a time of 
extreme danger for the nation, when supporting the country was potentially very costly. 
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Third, World War II allows us to collect different measures of patriotic support, and show 
that our results hold across a wide range of indicators of patriotism. Finally, because the 
New Deal happened after World War I, we can control for pre-existing levels of 
patriotism. This in turn allows us to capture changes in patriotic support caused by the 
expansion of public relief measures. 
Our paper speaks to the rich historical literature on the origins of nationalism. A well-
established school of thought sees nation states as a product of the modern era, promoted 
by deliberate policies of the elites and made possible by innovations of the Industrial 
Revolution. Central to these theories is the idea that nation states are “imagined 
communities” of genetically unrelated individuals, who are induced to pledge to a 
common cause by the policies passed by central governments (Anderson, 2006). Among 
these policies, there is the creation of modern, national school systems (Hobsbawm, 
1990; Weber, 1976; Gellner,1983) and the promotion of a common culture through new 
media such as the press (Anderson, 2004) or the national television (Hobsbawm, 1990). 
According to these theories, these policies were essential to develop a standardized 
language, a common culture and a shared set of myths and traditions (Canetti, 1962; 
Ranger and Hobsbawm, 1983).3 Our results are most closely related to the work of 
Colley (1992) and Weber (1976) who study the role of army and war in the rise of the 
national identity of Britain and France.  
Several economists have recently formalized some of these theories. Alesina and Reich 
(2013) and Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2016) show how elites can exploit 
nationalism to establish strong, high-end states that are able to levy taxes and enforce 
laws. Gennaioli and Voth (2015) focus on war, and argue that external threat can lead to 
state formation by forcing a central government to raise taxes. Within this literature, our 
results speak directly to the theory of Alesina, et al. (2017), who suggest that states 
started providing public goods through a comprehensive welfare system in order to 
induce large armies of citizens to fight for the nation. 
Our paper is part of a growing literature that analyzes empirically these theories. Miguel 
(2004) studies the role of education in some regions of Tanzania, where a conscious 
effort of nation-building through a systematic educational reform has established a 
national identity much stronger than in neighboring areas of Kenya. In contrast, Fouka 
(2016) finds that during World War I, an aggressive U.S. education policy aimed at 
integrating the children of German immigrants backfired: she shows that German 
children who were forbidden to speak their mother tongue in school were more likely to 
marry other Germans and call their own children with German names. Similarly, Dehdari 
and Gehring (2017) find that German education policies in Alsace and Lorraine at the end 
of 1800 made Frenchmen living there today less likely to identify with France. Bandiera 
et al. (2015) provide evidence that central governments deliberately use education 
systems to “build the nation,” and show that during the 19th century, U.S. states with 
                                                          
3 The creation of these traditions is also key to the "ethnosymbolism" theory of Smith (1991), who 
emphasizes the role of ethnic groups in developing these myths and traditions. 
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stronger needs to integrate immigrants introduced compulsory schooling earlier. The only 
other paper who establishes a link between war and nation building is Dell and Querubin 
(2016), who show that more destructive U.S. air strikes on Vietnam villages strengthened 
Vietnamese resistance activity during the Vietnam War, thus helping to create a stronger 
state. 
More broadly, our paper is also related to the literature that studies the determinants of 
attitudes and beliefs.4 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2016) argue that Italian cities with 
a historical tradition of self-governance in the Middle Ages still display more cooperative 
behavior, trust, and higher economic efficiency today. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) 
show that the slave trade undermined trust amongst Africans; Alesina, Nunn and Giuliano 
(2013) demonstrate that areas with plough agriculture in the past continue to exhibit more 
uneven gender roles today. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) argue that the after-
effects of living under the Socialist German Democratic Republic are still visible in 
attitudes today. Voigtländer and Voth (2012, 2015) show that anti-Semitism in Germany 
persisted at the local level over half a millennium; at the same time, Nazi schooling 
amplified its effects decisively at the local level. 
Finally, our results on voluntary enlistment and heroic actions are related to research that 
has studied what motivates people to join the army and die for the nation. Campante and 
Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) examine the extent to which the willingness to fight for one’s 
country is passed down the generations and Costa and Kahn (2003, 2007) study the 
importance of unit cohesion and of tightly-knit communities of origin. Looking at aerial 
combat, Ager et al. (2018) show that status competition led World War II German pilots 
to perform better when one of their peers received an award or an honorary mention.  
Relative to the existing literature, we make three main contributions: First, ours is – to 
our knowledge – the first paper to empirically demonstrate that greater welfare provision 
leads to a greater willingness to fight for one’s country. Second, we show how attitudes 
can be modified by an effective government intervention. By comparing volunteering 
rates in US counties during WWII with those from WWI, we derive a measure of changes 
in patriotism – and it is these changes that New Deal spending can explain. Third, we 
demonstrate how nationalism at the local level finds expression in several ways at the 
same time – with some individuals committing financial resources, others voluntarily 
putting themselves in harms’ way and few performing heroic actions.  
1. Historical background 
a. U.S. Patriotism during the two world wars 
The United States entered both World Wars late and reluctantly. In 1914, when war broke 
out in Europe, most Americans saw it as a distant conflict that Europeans should settle 
among themselves (Kennedy, 2004; Tuchman, 1957). These sentiments were clearly 
                                                          
4 Bisin and Verdier (2000; 2001) develop theories explaining the emergence of culture and Shayo (2009) a 
model of group identity formation. 
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expressed in the 1915 presidential campaign, when Wilson won re-election in part by 
taking credit for keeping the U.S. out of the war. In 1939, American attitudes towards war 
were equally cool, and during the 1939 presidential election both candidates campaigned 
on an isolationist platform.  
In both World Wars, the United States eventually joined the fighting. In January 1917, 
Wilson was still determined to preserve American neutrality when, in the famous 
Zimmermann telegram incident, Germany’s Foreign Ministry promised the Mexican 
President territorial gains in exchange for making war on the U.S. When the British 
intelligence intercepted the telegram and released it to the American public, President 
Wilson had no choice but to declare war on Germany (Tuchman, 1957). In 1941, it was 
Japan that attacked Pearl Harbor, forcing the US entry into the war; Germany declared 
war on the US in the immediate aftermath.  
After the declaration of war, both in 1917 and in 1941, patriotic sentiments quickly 
spread through the American society, and people showed support in a variety of ways. In 
this paper, we measure patriotism with three separate indicators, which signal various 
degrees of commitment to the national cause: the purchase of war bonds, military 
volunteering and heroic actions awarded a military medal. We observe volunteering and 
military awards for both World Wars; war bond purchases are available only for World 
War II. Here we briefly discuss why these measures signal local patriotic sentiments. 
The Federal government issued war bonds (“Series E bonds”) between May 1941 and 
December 1945: overall, the bonds financed about 186 billion dollars of the war debt 
(Department of Commerce, 1975). The first bonds appeared before the declaration of 
war, and were known as “defense bonds.” Soon after Pearl Harbor, the Federal 
government began marketing bonds more aggressively, in successive “war loan drives” 
that appealed to the patriotic sentiments of Americans. Advertisements presented the 
purchase of war bonds as the only honorable alternative to direct engagement in combat. 
A typical ad would show pictures of soldiers in action, it would read “For Our America,” 
“Let’s All Fight” or “We can’t all go… but we can all help!” and it would conclude with 
the injunction: “Buy War Bonds!” Bonds were non-transferable and they were 
redeemable in 40 years. The face value of the war bonds varied from $25 to $10.000, but 
they were sold below par at 75 cents on the dollar. With a 1940 monthly median income 
of about $75,5 the cheapest war bond was worth about one third of the monthly income: 
buying it required forgoing current consumption, and we take it as an indicator of support 
for the national cause. 
The second measure of patriotism is voluntary enlistment in the U.S. army: a measure 
that we observe in both World Wars. In 1917 and then again in 1941, the U.S. armed 
forces were not prepared for a major conflict on the other side of the world, and relied 
heavily on volunteerism in the first months of the war. Between April and June 1917 half 
                                                          
5 The median yearly income of people aged 14 to 60 and classified as private or public employees was $880 
(King et al., 2010). Income of farmers and self-employed workers is not reliable in 1940 and we exclude 
them from this calculation. 
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a million men volunteered to serve in the U.S. army, a number so large that military 
officials worried that it would jeopardize the war effort (Crowder, 1918).6 Similarly, 
within one year from the declaration of war on Japan, approximately 3 million men had 
volunteered to join the U.S. military (NARA, 2002). During both conflicts, volunteering 
was eventually suspended, and replaced by a Selective Service System that equalized the 
risk of military service across districts. The Army ceased to accept volunteers on the 15th 
of December 1917 during World War I (Crowder, 1919, p.6) and on the 5th of December 
1942 during World War II.7 For these reasons, volunteering during the first year of the 
war is the best available indicator of the willingness to fight for one’s nation. While not 
necessarily deadly, in both conflicts signing up for the Army required a man to leave his 
family and forgo profitable employment at home. As the economy approached full 
employment, such opportunities must have been more attractive than the meager pay 
offered by the Army, and volunteering must have appeared a relatively costly choice. 
Our last measure of patriotism looks at war heroes. We identify World War II heroes with 
recipients of military awards. Recipients of these awards had to go well beyond the call 
of duty, taking initiatives that exposed them to great dangers: 37.4 percent of the heroes 
in our database received the award for actions that had them killed. These heroes are 
obviously different from the average U.S. veteran, and represent an extreme example of 
soldier, who is willing to risk his life for the nation. We consider the places where these 
heroes grew up as “patriotic counties,” because they inspired them to sacrifice their lives 
for the nation. While none of these measures is perfect, we believe that each of them 
captures relevant aspects of patriotism that are informative about underlying sentiments 
towards the nation. 
b. Emergency relief under the New Deal  
Between the first and the second World War, the United States experienced the largest 
economic recession of the twentieth century. Under the leadership of president Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, the Federal government reacted with the greatest expansion in the 
public sector in the history of the country. The Great Depression began in 1929, with 
millions of jobs lost and output declining by 33% until 1933 (Christiano et al., 2004). 
During the 1933 presidential elections, the Democratic candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt 
promised a “New Deal” – a set of programs that would support workers suffering from 
the depression and would restore economic growth. After winning the elections, 
Roosevelt went on to implement the largest peacetime expansion of the public sector: 
during the 1930s the government share in GNP more than doubled from 4 to 9 percent 
                                                          
6 U.S. General Crowder, responsible of the 1917 Selective Service Draft wrote in 1918: 
If farms, factories, railroads and industries were not to be left crippled, if not ruined by 
the indiscriminate volunteering of key and pivotal men, then in the face of an enemy as 
Germany, the total military effectiveness of the Nation would have been lessened rather 
than strengthened by the assembly of 1.000.000 volunteers. (Crowder, 1918, p. 6). 
7 Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Executive Order 9279—Providing for the most effective mobilization and 
utilization of the national manpower and transferring the selective service system to the war manpower 
commission," December 5, 1942. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60973. 
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(Wallis and Oates, 1998). The Federal government started a host of programs designed to 
support different groups of the population. In this study we focus on overall non-
repayable grants issued between 1933 and 1939, which amounted to more than 16 billion 
dollars, and on the Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants, which transferred 
almost 2 billion dollars to American farmers (Fishback et al., 2003).8 
2. Data 
We assemble data from a variety of sources. We proxy county-level patriotism sentiment 
with three variables: purchases of war bonds, military volunteering and military awards. 
We measure the level of New Deal financial support with county-level expenditure from 
every program the Federal government financed between 1933 and 1939. We identify the 
causal effect of one of these programs, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, by 
exploiting data on the incidence of severe droughts between 1933 and 1939. Controls 
include World War I casualties and demographic and economic variables from the 1920, 
1930 and 1940 Census.  
We measure the diffusion of war bonds at the county level with the average sales per 
capita in 1944. We exclude sales to corporations, so that our figures only account for 
sales to individuals. The Treasury Department collected the data from reports of the 
Federal Reserve Banks. The Census Bureau published these tables in the County Data 
Book of 1947 and ICPRS digitized them in the 1970s (ICPRS, 2012). 
Volunteering in the two wars comes from two separate sources. We measure World War I 
volunteering with data from Crowder (1918). Major General Enoch H. Crowder was 
responsible for the implementation of the Selective Service System of 1917. In order to 
make sure that the Army draft inducted men homogeneously across the country, his 
department collected county-level data on voluntary army enlistments to June 30, 1917 
(Crowder 1918, p.15). We digitize these data, and use them to calculate World War I 
volunteering as the share of soldiers who volunteered from each county. We construct an 
equivalent measure for World War II with enlistment data from the National Archives 
(NARA, 2002). The National Archives used pictures of the original punch cards to 
digitize 9.2 million individual records of U.S. soldiers who served in the Army between 
1938 and 1946. We collect the full population of records digitized, and identify 
volunteers and inducted men by the first digit of soldiers’ serial number.9,10 Our measure 
                                                          
8 These funds do not include 10 billion dollars offered by the Federal government in loans nor 2.7 billion 
dollar in insurance provided by the Federal Housing Administration. 
9 From the full series of 9.2 million men, we exclude 1.77 million records of officers, of National 
Guardsmen or of soldiers with no information on residence before enlistment. We also drop half a million 
soldiers who registered in the 7th Service Command, for which the National Archive series has poor 
coverage (most serial numbers starting with digits “37” are missing: these serial numbers were assigned in 
the 7th Service Command:  NARA, 2005). The 7th Service Command included the states of Colorado, Iowa, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Wyoming, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota. 
10 Volunteers were reserved serial numbers starting with “1”, while the Army assigned to inducted men 
serial numbers starting with “3” (Army Regulation 615-30, 1942; see also Fouka, 2017). 
10 
of volunteering in World War II is equal to the number of men who volunteered divided 
by the total number of men enlisted in every county.  
The sample of war medal recipients of World War II comes from the online source 
homeofheroes.com11 which assembles a 15’000 pages encyclopedia on American soldiers 
and war medals. We collect data for military awards like the Distinguished Service Cross. 
This is a medal that is awarded to any person who:  
“while serving in any capacity with the U.S. Army, has 
distinguished himself or herself by exceptionally meritorious 
service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility.”12 
 
We normalize the number of medals and divide it by 1000 times the number of registrants 
in each county. 
Fishback et al. (2003) assembled county-level data on each Federal program 
implemented between 1933 and 1939 from the U.S. Office of Government reports. Our 
two main explanatory variables are the total value of non-repayable grants and the total 
value of Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants, one of the largest items funded 
by the New Deal. We observe both measures at the county level; we normalize total 
expenditure by dividing it by the 1930 county population and the agricultural relief by the 
number of farmers in 1930. Figures for both population and farmers in 1930 come from 
the Federal Census (King et al., 2010). 
Agricultural relief was especially generous in counties that were hit by adverse weather 
shocks. We identify the causal effect of agricultural relief by instrumenting the 
Agricultural Adjustments Administration grants with the (logarithm of the) number of 
months with a severe drought between 1933 and 1939. We source drought data from the 
National Climatic Data Center of NOAA, which provides the Palmer Drought Severity 
Index for every month since 1900 for 376 climate divisions in the continental US. The 
Index ranges from -7 to 7, and drought months take index values of -3 or lower.  
We use the share of soldiers killed during World War I as additional control in some 
regressions. We collect the full population of soldiers killed in World War I from 
“Soldiers of the Great War” (Haulsee, et al., 1920): the publication lists the names and 
county of enlistment of every soldier who died in Europe during World War I. We 
construct the share of soldiers who died in this war as number of soldiers killed divided 
by number of soldiers enlisted in a county. Other demographic and economic 
characteristics come from the U.S. Decennial Census. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our main variables. In the average county, people 
purchased war bonds worth $68 per person. The share of volunteers declined from 35% 
in 1917 to 17.7% in 1940-1945; in the average county 165 soldiers volunteered to fight 
                                                          
11 As the US military does not hold complete records of all awards, it is hard to estimate how representative 
our sample is. The complete url to the website is: http://www.homeofheroes.com/  
12 http://govdocs.rutgers.edu/mil/army/r600_8_22.pdf 
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World War I and 498 in World War II. These figures vary significantly by county (as 
indicated by the large standard deviations). The average county had one war hero, 0.43 
every 1000 soldiers. Figures 2 through 4 illustrate the spatial distribution of per capita 
war bonds purchases, volunteer rate and medals per registrants during World War II. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
a. War support and New Deal Welfare 
In this section, we document the correlation between World War II patriotism and New 
Deal spending. Figure 1 displays our main result in a simple graphical way. We observe 
that places that received greater welfare support during the New Deal era show more 
determined support for their nation during World War II both at home (through war bond 
purchases) and on the battlefields (through volunteering and heroic awards). 
We now examine the data more rigorously, and estimate the following regressions:   
 WWII Supporti =  α + β log(New Deal grants per capita)i + γ Xi + SCi  + ui (1) 
In all regressions the units of observation are counties, indexed with i. WWII Supporti is 
one of our three measures of local support for US war efforts during World War II. We 
provide results using the log of per capita war bonds purchases in 1944, the share of 
volunteers and the share of soldiers who received a medal during World War II. We are 
interested in the coefficient of log(New Deal grants per capita)i, , which identifies the 
correlation between World War II support and welfare relief received during the New 
Deal era. We measure welfare relief with overall New Deal spending per capita, and in 
some specifications we break it down between agricultural relief per farmer and other 
type of relief per capita. Xi is a vector of county-level controls, including the (logarithm 
of the) number of soldiers enlisted, the 1917 volunteering rate, the casualty rate during 
World War I, an indicator for whether the county was home of a World War I hero, 
unemployment share in 1940 and an indicator for whether a county was urban in 1930. 
Controlling of the volunteering in 1917 is especially important because it allows us to 
filter out the effect of places where patriotism was always higher before the New Deal. In 
the most demanding specifications, we include nine service command fixed effects (SCi) 
to account for unobserved geographical heterogeneity.13 
We report our main results on Table 2. We start with the easiest way to contribute to the 
war effort: buying war bonds. The first column of Table 2 reports a simple OLS 
regression of per capita 1944 war bond sales on per capita New Deal spending. We take 
logarithms of both variables, so the estimated coefficient is an elasticity. Our first 
estimate indicates that a 1 percent increase in New Deal spending is associated with a 
0.49 percent increase in war bonds purchases. In column 2, we add controls and the 
coefficient remains unaffected in size and significance. In column 3, we add service 
command fixed effects, and the size of the coefficient falls but it remains highly 
                                                          
13 The U.S. Army organized recruitment in continental states across nine separate Service Commands. 
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significant. In column 4, we disaggregate New Deal spending into farm support and other 
relief payments and find that they had effects roughly similar in size. 
Next, we examine a more costly way to support the nation: volunteering for military 
service. Overall, 39 percent of registered men volunteered for service between 1941 and 
1945. From column 5 we observe that when expenditure under the New Deal doubled, 
volunteering increased by 4 percent, or one fifth of the baseline volunteering rate. 
Emergency relief alone explains 7.5 percent of the variation in volunteering rates. In 
column 6, we add the usual set of controls, and the size of the coefficient falls but 
remains significant at the 0.1 percent level. In column 7, we add service command fixed 
effects: these make the size of the coefficient fall further, but it does not affect 
significance. Finally, in column 8, we show results for disaggregated New Deal spending 
and we find that both mattered. 
We conclude with the most costly indicator of patriotism: heroic actions. In the last set of 
regressions we ask whether counties that received higher welfare support during the 
1930s were home to more medal recipients. In column 9 we have no controls, and we 
find that a doubling of New Deal spending is associated with 0.15 more heroes every 
1,000 soldiers, about one third of the baseline level of this variable. In column 10 we add 
controls and in column 11 the service command fixed effects: the size of the coefficients 
remains positive throughout and remains significant at the 0.001 percent with controls 
and at the 0.098 percent with service command fixed effects. In the last column we break 
down welfare support into agricultural and non-agricultural: here we find that the 
agricultural component of welfare support is still strongly associated with the presence of 
war heroes, while the rest of New Deal spending is not. 
Before moving to a more systematic treatment of identification, we discuss one obvious 
concern with these results: namely, that areas that suffered more economic distress – and 
hence received more emergency relief – continued to be depressed in 1940. In these 
places, the opportunity cost to remain home may have been lower, and hence, 
volunteering rates higher. We believe that the full set of results in Table 2 helps to dispel 
this concern. First, we control for unemployment in 1940, and this has only minor impact 
on the point estimate of New Deal spending in column 6.14 Second, economic distress 
would hardly explain why people should be willing to risk their lives in combat, as the 
regressions with medal recipients suggest. Finally, and most importantly, the results with 
war bonds purchases in columns 1 through 4 are at odds with a story based only on 
temporary economic incentives. Where poverty reigned, people should have found it 
harder to support the war effort by postponing consumption and buying war bonds. 
Instead, we find that the opposite is true: places that received more New Deal payments 
were more likely to buy war bonds. We believe that the combination of the war bonds 
and volunteering results are hard to explain with stories based exclusively on economic 
distress. 
                                                          
14 Excluding only 1940 unemployment rate from regression on column 6 increases the point estimate by 
about 8 percent. 
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b. Identification 
In this section, we discuss the causal interpretation of the correlations between welfare 
support and patriotism. The estimates in Table 2 are consistent with the idea that people 
who received more generous aid during the Great Depression reciprocated with greater 
war support during World War II. Even though areas that received greater help during the 
1930s may have sent more volunteering at the beginning of the 1940s simply because 
they still had worse economic conditions, the results we find with different measures of 
patriotism are hard to reconcile with a simple story of economic incentives. However, it 
is still possible that unobserved characteristics, not directly related to welfare support, 
first attracted New Deal funds in the 1930s and then determined greater patriotic fervor in 
the 1940s. Additionally, it is also possible that the President or members of Congress 
successfully swayed New Deal funds towards those counties where there was greater 
patriotic support, either to reward these citizens, or to obtain electoral advantage. While 
controlling for World War I patriotic support never affects the estimates in Table 2, the 
share of volunteers in 1917 is positively correlated with New Deal spending (β = 0.16, p 
< 0.01). Additionally, Wright (1974), Wallis (1998) and Fishback et al. (2003) suggest 
that parts of Federal spending were allocated for political reasons, and indeed counties 
were the Democratic party performed worse between 1896 and 1928 received 
significantly more funds during the New Deal (β = -0.01, p < 0.01). Both omitted variable 
and strategic spending would bias the estimates in Table 2. 
In order to uncover the causal relation between welfare spending and patriotic support, 
we need plausibly exogenous variation in the level of New Deal transfers. However, the 
very breadth of New Deal programs makes it hard to identify a single variable that 
affected public spending in the 1930s and at the same time is excluded from equation (1). 
To make progress, we decide to focus on a single program within the New Deal, and we 
concentrate on the Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants. The Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration accounted for 13.5 percent of all 1933-39 spending and it was 
designed to help agricultural workers in distress. In Table 2 we already showed that this 
part of the New Deal spending is positively associated with patriotic support during 
World War II. 
Focusing on the Agricultural Adjustment Administration has several advantages. First, it 
was a well-defined program with a clear target population and great visibility. The Great 
Depression hit farmers particularly hard, and the beneficiaries of the Agricultural 
Adjustment program were likely to recognize the role of the Federal state in bringing 
relief during a difficult period. Second, the amount of agricultural relief is not correlated 
with World War I volunteering (β = 0.01, p = 0.93) nor with the share of Democratic vote 
before the New Deal (β = 0.00, p = 0.33). While it is still possible that some of the 
agricultural grants were allocated strategically, these correlations suggest that this was 
less widespread than for the rest of New Deal spending. Finally, by looking at only 
agricultural grant, we can exploit an instrument that is arguably excluded from equation 
(1): weather shocks.  
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During the 1930s, severe droughts hit different regions of the USA, ruining harvests and 
sending many farmers into bankruptcy. As a result, a great part of the agricultural grants 
were designed to help these farmers to weather the shock. We propose to use the presence 
of a drought between 1933 and 1939 as an instrument for Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration grants. In the next section we show how droughts that happened during 
the New Deal period are a strong predictor of the grant received by farmers. In order for 
drought to be a valid instrument they must also be exogenous and excluded from equation 
(1), i.e. they must affect World War II patriotism only because they affected the amount 
of agricultural relief received. We think this is reasonable. First, since weather shocks 
were out of the control of politicians, strategic allocation of drought-related relief is not a 
concern. Second, although extremely severe, the 1930s droughts are not the first episode 
of adverse weather in the history of the USA. In section 5 we show that earlier droughts 
that brought no Federal relief are not correlated with patriotic sentiment during World 
War II. This suggests that the reason why we find this correlation for the 1930s droughts 
is because they were met with welfare spending.  
Finally, Table 3 reports correlations between droughts and other county characteristics. 
When we look at unconditional correlations on panel A of Table 3, we find that counties 
that suffered harsher droughts were significantly smaller, were less likely to be home of a 
World War I hero, had 0.3 percent higher unemployment in 1930 and were less likely to 
vote Democratic until 1928. These correlations are likely the result of droughts hitting 
mainly the interior of the United States: when we replicate the same regressions including 
8 service command fixed effects we find that only 1930 population remains significantly 
smaller in counties that suffered more from New Deal-era droughts. Panel B of Table 3 
reports the coefficients of regressions between pre-existing characteristics and New Deal 
era droughts after including service command fixed effects: the table shows that the 
severity of 1930s is not correlated with volunteering, casualty rate and likelihood of 
having a hero during World War I. Within service commands, droughts are also 
uncorrelated with pre-existing support for the Democratic party, urbanization and 
unemployment rate in 1930. The lack of correlation with observable characteristics 
makes us confident that within these broad geographical areas the instrument is also 
uncorrelated with other unobservable characteristics that may affect patriotism. 
c. First stage: New Deal-era droughts and agricultural relief 
We start by documenting the strong relationship between post-1933 droughts and 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants during the 1930s. The AAA programs 
supported farmers by either directly, by buying crops at controlled prices, or indirectly, 
by paying farmers to reduce cultivated acres.15 Because many of these interventions were 
designed in response to adverse weather shocks, we expect these shocks to predict the 
amount of agricultural relief grants extended to different counties. We focus on one 
specific weather shock that repeatedly affected American farmers in the 1930s: droughts. 
Figure 5 displays the unconditional relationship between droughts and agricultural grants: 
                                                          
15 The purpose of acreage reduction was to reduce output and thereby increase prices (Libecap, 1997). 
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we plot the log number of months with severe droughts between 1933 and 1939 on the 
horizontal axis and the log of the agricultural grants per farmer on the vertical axis. The 
graph reveals the strong correlation between these two variables, and confirms that an 
important part of the agricultural emergency funds were allocated in response to 
exogenous weather shocks. 
Next, we verify that the relationship survives more demanding specifications. We 
estimate variations of the following equation: 
 log(AAA grant per farmer)i =  θ + δ log(# droughts months)i + ξ Xi + SCi  + ui (2) 
The dependent variable in equation (2) is the log value of Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration grants per farmer. The main explanatory variable is our excluded 
instrument: the log of the number of months in which county i experienced a severe 
drought between 1933 and 1939. We will control for the usual set of county-level 
characteristics Xi and in the most demanding specification we include a set of service 
command fixed effects SCi. 
Table 4 reports first stage estimates. In the first column we show the unconditional 
correlation between AAA grants and New Deal-era droughts: the coefficient of the 
instrument is positive and highly significant, with an F-statistic well above the rule-of-
the-thumb value of 10. In the second column we add all other county-level controls: the 
coefficient of the weather shock drops by 6 percent, but significance remains below 0.1 
percent and the F well above 10. Finally, in column 3 we report the estimates of a 
regression that includes service command fixed effect. The coefficient of our instrument 
drops further, but in this specification the F is equal to 252. The estimates on Table 4 
indicate that a 1 percent increase in the number of months with drought lead to an 
increase in agricultural grants that is between 0.5 and 0.7 percent. This appears a sizeable 
effect. 
Overall, these results confirm that weather shock are a strong instrument for agricultural 
relief. Moreover, the results with service command fixed effects confirm that even within 
homogeneous regions, differential impact of weather shocks created significant 
differences in agricultural relief. This is important because in Table 3 we showed that 
within the same regions pre-existing characteristics are not significantly correlated with 
post-1933 droughts. Thus, the combined results of Table 3 and 4 suggest that, conditional 
on service command fixed effects, New Deal-era droughts are both excluded from the 
structural equation (1) and a strong instrument for our endogenous variable. 
d. Reduced form: New Deal-era droughts and war support 
Next, we turn to the direct relationship between New Deal-era droughts and our measure 
of World War II support. We begin by showing the basic patterns in the data in a 
graphical way. In the three panels of Figure 6, we plot our drought instrument on the 
horizontal axis and our measures of World War II support on the vertical axes. On the left 
panel we look at per capita war bond purchases, and find a strong positive correlation 
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between this variable and New Deal-era droughts. In the central panel we look at World 
War II volunteering rate: also this variable displays a strong positive correlation with the 
droughts. Finally, on the right panel we examine the share of war hero among U.S. 
soldiers: once more, we find a strong and positive relationship between these variables. 
We next perform a formal analysis of these relationships and estimate the equations: 
 WWII Support i =  π + ρ log(# droughts months)i + ζ Xi + SCi  + ui (3) 
In equation (3) WWII Support is one of our three county-level measure of war support, 
and we are interested in the coefficient of our instrument, ρ. We report our results on 
Table 5. We start on columns 1-3 with per capita war bond purchases. On column 1 we 
report the unconditional correlation, on column 2 we add all county-level controls and on 
column 3 we add the service commands fixed effects. The coefficient of post-1933 
droughts is positive and significant at the 1 percent level across all specifications, 
indicating that counties that were hit by more severe droughts spent more in war bonds 
during World War II. The next three columns of Table 5 turn to volunteering rate, and 
report estimates of regressions with no controls (column 4), with county-level controls 
(column 5) and with controls and service command fixed effects (column 6). Across all 
specifications, droughts between 1933 and 1939 are a strong predictor of World War II 
volunteering, with p-value always below 1 percent. Finally, the last three columns of 
Table 5 look at the number recipients of military awards per 1000 soldiers. Also for this 
measure of patriotism we find a strong and positive correlation with droughts: counties 
that experienced harsher droughts during the 1930s were more likely to be home of 
World War II heroes. 
Overall, the results in Table 5 reveal a strong and positive correlations of post-1933 
droughts and each of our three measures of patriotism. Because weather shocks are 
exogenous, the coefficients on Table 5 identify the causal effect of droughts on the 
different indicators of World War II support. Under the additional assumption that post-
1933 droughts affected World War II patriotism only because they induced the Federal 
government to extend welfare support to farmers, then instrumenting agricultural relief 
with droughts identifies the causal effect of welfare relief on war support. Overall, we 
believe that the full set of results shown on Table 5 provides strong support for the idea 
that farmers reciprocated the relief received during the New Deal by supporting the war 
effort more enthusiastically. 
e. Two-stages least squares estimates 
We discuss here our two-stage least square results. In section 4.a we have shown that 
World War II support correlates strongly with overall New Deal spending as well as with 
the part of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants. In this section, we estimate 
a variation of equation (1), where we substitute per capita New Deal spending with 
agricultural relief per farmer: 
 WWII Supporti =  α + β log(AAA grant per farmer)i + γ Xi + SCi  + ui (4) 
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Because we believe that agricultural grants may be endogenous in equation (4) we 
instrument it with the log number of months with severe droughts between 1933 and 
1939. Since droughts are exogenous and unlikely to affect patriotic sentiment directly, the 
two-stage least square estimates identify the causal effect of agricultural relief on World 
War II support. 
Table 6 reports our results. In columns 1 through 3 we show the estimates of equation (4) 
when the dependent variable is the per capita war bond purchases: in column 1 we have 
no controls, on column  2 we include county-level controls and on column 3 we add the 
service command fixed effects. Across all specifications, we find that greater agricultural 
relief during the 1930s was met with higher World War II bond purchases. The 
coefficients always significant at less than 1 percent and they are stable across 
specifications. The estimate on column 3 implies an elasticity of war bond purchases to 
agricultural grants of about 0.46.  
In column 4 to 6 we look at volunteering shares. New Deal agricultural relief is positively 
and significantly correlated with this measure of patriotism too: all coefficients are 
significant at conventional levels and they remain stable when we add county-level 
controls (on column 5) and service command fixed effects (on column 6). The coefficient 
on column 6 implies that one standard deviation of per farmer agricultural grants (1.14) 
leads to an increase in the volunteer share of 0.04, which is equivalent to 53 percent of 
the standard deviation of the dependent variable – a sizeable effect. 
Finally, on column 7 through 9 we report the estimates of the regression with the number 
of war heroes per 1000 registrants as dependent variable. As for the other outcomes, we 
present specifications without controls (on column 7) with county-level controls (on 
column 8) and with service command fixed effects (on column 9). Across all these 
specifications, we find a consistently positive effect of New Deal agricultural relief on the 
share of World War II soldiers that earned a medal. The point estimates are always 
significant at less than 0.01 percent, and very stable. The coefficient on column 9 implies 
that a one standard deviation in agricultural grants led to 1 more war medal every 4000 
soldiers, which is equivalent to 37 percent of a standard deviation of the dependent 
variable. 
Overall, the results shown this section offer strong support to a causal interpretation of 
the link between welfare expansion and war support for the case under exam. 
4. Robustness 
a. Placebos 
In this section, we use placebo tests to tackle three concerns. First of all, we use droughts 
before the New Deal to show that direct effects of our instrument on patriotism are 
unlikely to be of great concern. Secondly, we test whether welfare was simply allocated 
to already more patriotic areas in the first place and finally, we investigate whether the 
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observed treatment effect is actually driven by the treated by comparing the effect of 
agricultural spending across different professions.  
Our identification strategy hinges on the assumption that severe droughts in the US were 
an important determinant of relief spending during the New Deal, influencing 
volunteering from December 1941 onwards. This in turn implies that droughts before 
1933 should have no effect on patriotism after 1941 – because the government did not 
step in to help on any significant scale. Figure 7 shows when severe droughts hit the US. 
We use the drought months from 1933-39 for our IV, but there were severe droughts 
before 1933. In particular, in 1931, there was significant agricultural distress due to 
drought conditions in the mid-Western US (Figure 7). We use the pre-1933 droughts as 
placebos. 
If heavy droughts have a direct effect on patriotism after 1941, we should expect similar 
reduced form results for the drought in 1931 and 1934. Figure 8a-c shows that this is not 
the case. While the (pre-New Deal) drought in 1931 has a negative and significant impact 
on volunteering, the similarly strong drought in 1934 shows the opposite effect. This 
suggests that potential direct effects of drought (at most) introduce a downward bias in 
our IV regression and cannot account for the positive effect of spending on volunteering. 
Note as well that all pre-New Deal coefficients are non-positive while all New Deal 
coefficients show strong and positive effects.16 
If direct effects do not introduce a bias into our results, perhaps agricultural (and other 
forms) of government support went more readily to more patriotic areas because they 
were better connected to Washington? We examine this empirically by plotting 1917 
volunteering against agricultural support in the 1930s (Figure 6).  
There is no statistically significant relationship between farm relief in the 1930s and 
volunteering in 1917 (p-value 0.56), and the sign is negative. This suggests that pre-
existing differences in local sentiment towards the nation are not correlated with income 
support for farmers during the 1930s. 
b. Channel 
Finally, one potential interpretation of the ols results is that government intervention can 
win hearts and minds. It seems intuitive to expect the largest reaction to this intervention 
among the people who actually benefited of the New Deal to the greatest extent. 
However, using our aggregate results so far, we cannot tell who is driving the surge in 
patriotic action in high welfare counties.  
To investigate this question, we exploit that the WW2 enlistment data gives us the 
civilian occupation of each draftee and volunteer. Using Dictionary of Occupational Title 
                                                          
16 The fact that 1933 has no positive effect should not discourage us for two reasons. First of all, drought in 
1933 was of small magnitude (Figure 7). Secondly, despite the impressive speed of Roosevelt’s legislation 
efforts, it takes time for an administration to set up a functioning welfare program (Figure 8a-c). 
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codes, we cluster all occupations into groups17 and further construct for each profession x 
two variables in county i. 
 
 
 hences gives the share of volunteering farmers over all volunteers in 
county i. Counties with high values of this variable hence have unusually many farmers 
among their volunteers. To make sure that this is not simply driven by agricultural 
counties having more farmers, we construct the variable  as well 
which measures the share of drafted farmers over all draftees. As the draftees were 
selected at random by a lottery, the professional composition of draftees in a county gives 
us a representative estimate of the labour market composition as a whole. 
Table 7 presents the baseline regression results. We regress agricultural and non-
agricultural welfare spending on the share of farmers among volunteers and find that 
farmers make up a larger than usual shares of volunteers in places with high agricultural 
spending. By controlling for the share of farmers among draftees (Columns 2-4) and 
alternatively for farmers per capita in 1940 (Column 5), we rule out that the number of 
farmers in a county make this result purely mechanical. 
The next step is to see how farmers reacted to non-agricultural spending. Columns 6-10 
find a negative correlation between non-agricultural spending and the share of farmers 
among volunteers. There was hence a substitution away from farmer volunteers in places 
where welfare did not target them. A potential explanation for this would be that welfare 
was provided to different people and different people henceforth reacted to it.  
Figure 9 analyses this idea more systematically. It shows the point estimates of regressing 
(non-) agricultural welfare spending on the share of each occupation group among 
volunteers.18 This provides us with another placebo. If our hypothesis holds that only 
welfare recipients show reactions to welfare spending, we expect a substitution away 
from other professions towards farmers in high-welfare spending counties. Equivalently, 
counties with high non-agricultural spending helped a completely different set of people 
back on their feet – likely lower-skilled – and we would expect fewer farmers and more 
lower-skilled occupations to display more patriotism. This is exactly what we find: 
                                                          
17 Occupation codes range from 0-999. Professionals (0-100), clerks (101-199), service jobs (200-299), 
agriculture jobs (300-399), manufacturing jobs (400-499), skilled (500-699), semi-skilled (700-799) and 
unskilled jobs (800-999). 
18 All specifications control for the share of draftees of the respective occupation. 
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agricultural spending wins exclusively the hearts and minds of farmers. Non-agricultural 
spending wins the hearts and minds of lower-skilled workers.  
We do not believe that the heterogeneous effect of welfare across professions can be 
explained by an economic shock that had a similarly heterogenous effect across 
occupations. This is because in general equilibrium the economic opportunities of all 
workers should be hit by the adverse effects of the drought.  
c. Instrument validity 
To examine the robustness of our instrumental variable strategy, we implement the 
procedure described by Conley et al. (2012). If the exogeneity assumption was violated, 
how strong would the direct effect of drought on volunteering have to be before the link 
from relief to volunteering becomes insignificant? Conley et al. (2012) develop a method 
that allows to answer this question, by specifying a distribution of the direct effect of the 
instrument on the outcome variable. 
We implement their union of confidence intervals approach. In our baseline, without any 
controls, we find a coefficient (t-statistic) of 0.059 (13.43) for relief per farmer, using log 
months of drought in the New Deal era as the instrument. If we allow for a direct effect of 
drought, then, to be greater than zero (at 95% confidence) the coefficient for the direct 
effect should not be greater than 0.032 – or more than half of the indirect effect. We 
consider this to be unlikely – and all the more so since areas with above-average farm 
relief during the 1930s have, by 1940, lower unemployment on average than the rest of 
the country. 
d. Balancedness 
The overall balancedness of our sample is less than perfect. Areas with more relief are on 
average less populous; they had fewer World War I deaths; unemployment in 1930 was 
higher than in the rest of the country, while the opposite was true for 1940. To strengthen 
the validity of our ols results, we use two methods to deal with the lack of balance – 
entropy balancing and matching.  
Entropy balancing 
Hainmueller (2012) introduced a method of changing weights so as to mechanically 
balance a dataset based on observable covariate characteristics. We implement his 
method by balancing on our standard set of controls we use in all regressions19 to 
preserve consistency and account for various dimensions of imbalances. The effect we 
aim to identify is the average treatment effect of receiving more grants per capita than the 
median county while re-balancing the treatment (above median welfare) and control 
                                                          
19 Share of volunteers and casualties in WW1, a dummy for whether a county had at least one medal 
recipient in WW1, the log number of registrants in WW2, the unemployment share in 1940, a dummy for 
whether a county had urban population in 1930 and the average share of Democrat votes from 1896 to 
1928. 
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group (below median welfare) in a way to make them as similar as possible. Table A1 
shows that entropy balancing succeeds in rebalancing the sample. 
Figures 10a-c plot the results of the baseline sample and the entropy-balanced sample 
side-by-side for all of our three outcomes. We can see that the coefficients are only once 
significantly different from each other and always positive and significant.  
Matching 
An alternative approach uses nearest-neighbor matching to increase the similarity of 
observations that we implicitly compare. We implement the procedure by Abadie et al. 
(2004). In Table A2, we use 3, 8, and 12 nearest-neighbor matches20 and investigate the 
average treatment effect of being an “above median welfare recipient”. Columns 1-3 of 
Table A1 only use latitude, longitude and log population in 1940 to match counties and 
find positive and significant results if we use more than 3 neighbors for comparison for 
both bonds and volunteering.  
If we aim to compare counties with similar population size but disregard geographical 
location, we also get a positive and significant effect for medals (columns 4-6). As we 
have to assume that counties differ by more than their population, columns 7-9 also use 
the standard set of controls (compare footnote 19) as additional matching variables. This 
setup hence now only compares counties that are similar on many relevant dimensions 
and find that above median welfare counties were consistently more patriotic in WW2 
(although the effect on medals is not signficiant).  
e. Alternative specificationsIn this section, we show that our results are robust to 
alternative measures of volunteering. These results mitigate two separate concerns: one 
about measurement error and one about strategic volunteering. Our dependent variable 
may have measurement error because the National Archive could not digitize punch cards 
recorded on microfilms that in 2002 were of poor quality or were lost. As a result, the 
series of men who were inducted in the Army has relevant gaps,21 and this may introduce 
measurement error when we divide volunteers by the sum of volunteers and inducted 
men. On the other hand, volunteering could be strategic because it was open even to men 
who were inducted through the Selective Service System. To these people, volunteering 
was attractive because it allowed to choose at least the branch of the Army where they 
would serve. 
To show that the measurement error is not correlated with our explanatory variables, we 
replicate our analysis with two volunteering measures that are not affected by the missing 
data. To address concerns about strategic volunteering we show results with the share of 
volunteers in 1942, when volunteer numbers surged in response to the Pearl Harbor 
attack, and men were signing up for war arguably more as an emotional reaction than for 
long-term calculations. 
                                                          
20 8 is the average number of neighboring counties in the US. 
21 Using the list of missing numbers provided by the National Archives, we estimate that around 35% of 
records are missing in the inducted men series, against 15% in the volunteer series. 
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We construct the first alternative measure of volunteering as the number of volunteers 
from a county divided by its population, as recorded in the 1940 Census. Because both 
volunteers and population are measured precisely, we do not expect the measurement 
error to be serious in this variable. The second measure is the logarithm of the number of 
volunteers in each county: when we use this as dependent variable we are careful to 
control for the logarithm of the total 1940 population to account for differences in county 
size. We present our basic correlation results in Table A3. In the first 4 columns we 
report estimates when the dependent variable is volunteers per 1000 inhabitants. In the 
following 4 columns the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of volunteers.  
In all specifications the coefficients of interest remain positive and significant at the 1 
percent level: New Deal spending is positively correlated with both alternative measures 
of volunteering. Moreover each separate component of New Deal spending remains 
positively and significantly correlated with the alternative measures of volunteering. 
Additionally, 1933-1939 droughts predict higher volunteering, and when used to 
instrument agricultural relief we estimate a positive and highly significant effect of 
welfare support on volunteering. 
Columns 9 through 12 of Table A3 replicate the analysis using 1942 volunteers as a share 
of all men who served during the war. When we focus our attention to volunteers with 
less strategic motives, the correlation with New Deal spending remains significant and 
larger in size than our baseline. Similarly, the size of the coefficients in both the reduced 
form and the two-stages least squares shown in Tables A4 and A5 is always larger than 
the corresponding coefficients in our baseline specification. This suggests that if 
anything, our results becomes stronger when we measure patriotism with a measure that 
arguably better captures patriotic sentiment. 
We conclude this section by presenting a set of regressions that control for state fixed 
effects. While recruiting was organized at the level of “service commands,” a 
geographical division that organized different states together, it is possible that state-level 
unobservable characteristics affected both patriotism and New Deal relief. We show that 
such unobservable characteristics are unlikely to have a significant effect on our results in 
Table A6. In the first 3 columns we report regressions with our three measures of 
patriotism regressed on agricultural relief. Agricultural relief is positively correlated with 
all three measures of patriotism: it is highly significant when the dependent variable is the 
1944 war bond purchases per capita or the World War II volunteering rate. In contrast, 
when the dependent variable is World War II medals per 1000 soldiers the p-value is is 
0.12. We move to identification in columns 4-10 of the same table. In column 4 we 
estimate our first stage with state fixed effects: New Deal-era droughts still predict 
agricultural reliefs within states, and the F-statistics remains well above the critical value 
of 10 (F = 86). Columns 5 through 7 show the reduced form and columns 8 through 10 
the two-stages least squares. In all cases patriotism is positively correlated both with our 
instrument and with the part of agricultural relief that is explained by droughts even after 
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accounting for state fixed effects. We conclude that state-level unobservable 
characteristics are unlikely to be driving our results. 
5. Summary 
Humans are the only animal that that routinely cooperates with large-scale groups of 
genetically unrelated individuals. What sustains such cooperation is a key question in the 
social sciences (de Quervain et al. 2004). From an evolutionary perspective, the 
willingness to fight and die for one’s group is particularly puzzling – it is costly for the 
individual, but beneficial for the group. A growing literature has highlighted the 
importance of reciprocity to overcome selfish behavior – by either altruistically punishing 
defection, or by altruistically rewarding cooperation (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Sober and 
Wilson 1998).  
In this paper, we combine these two perspectives, by examining how greater emergency 
relief during the 1930s affected Americans’ willingness to perform patriotic acts during 
World War II. One strand of the literature on the link between welfare and warfare has 
focused on future benefits for soldiers – additional government handouts promised in the 
event of victory (Alesina et al. 2017). We emphasize a related but different perspective: 
an increased willingness to fight for one’s own country after having already received 
important economic support in times of crisis.  
Three key empirical facts support our argument: US counties receiving more relief 
payments during the 1930s bought more war bonds, sent more volunteers to the armed 
forces, and were home to more soldiers displaying conspicuous gallantry on the 
battlefield. The same pattern is visible for counties where income support for farmers was 
greatest because they were hit by adverse weather conditions. Because of the link 
between adverse weather and emergency relief, it seems likely that the relationship 
between welfare support and patriotism is causal. 
These results are in line with an interpretation that emphasizes individuals reciprocating 
towards the nation state if their national government came to their aid in bad times. In 
other words, attitudes and behaviors common in small-group settings – where they may 
have helped to create the basis of human cooperation – can be successfully transposed to 
the national level if people experience immediate support in times of distress, making 
them feel like a member of a “super organism” composed of millions of compatriots 
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FIGURES AND GRAPHS 
 
Figure 1: New Deal spending and support for US efforts in World War II. In each panel, the x-axis shows the log per 
capita New Deal grants. On the y-axis we plot the three measures of Patriotism: the log of 1944 purchases of war bonds 
per capita (left panel), share of World War II registrants who volunteered to serve (central panel) and number of World 
War II military award per 1000 soldiers (right panel). We exclude the 26 counties with more than 5 medals per 1000 




Figure 2. Geographical distribution of the log War Bond purchases per capita in 1944. Source: ICPSR (2012). 
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Figure 3: Share of volunteers relative to total registrants during World War II. We exclude the counties that belong to the 7th Service Command for which the National Archive 
have poor coverage. Source: NARA (2002). 
32 
Figure 4: Number of Medals of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Stars awarded during World War II per 1000 army registrants. We exclude the counties that belong 
to the 7th Service Command for which the National Archive have poor coverage. Source: homeofheroes.com and NARA (2002). 
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Figure 5: New Deal-era droughts and Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants. In each panel, the x-axis shows 
the log of the number of months with a severe drought between 1933 and 1939.  On the y-axis we plot our 
measurement for agricultural relief (log per farmer grants) and the x axis displays the log number of months with severe 
drought from 1933-39. 
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Figure 6. New Deal-era droughts and support for US efforts in World War II. In each panel, the x-axis shows the log of 
the number of months with a severe drought between 1933 and 1939. On the y-axis we plot the three measures of 
Patriotism: the log of 1944 purchases of war bonds per capita (left panel), share of World War II registrants who 
volunteered to serve (central panel) and number of World War II military award per 1000 soldiers (right panel). We 
exclude the 26 counties with more than 5 medals per 1000 soldiers to reduce the influence of these outliers. Results are 




Figure 7: Upper time series displays the share of agricultural spending over total government spending (Libecap, 
1997). The lower time series displays average number months with severe drought across time in the US. Red line in 




Figure 8a. Placebo for volunteering outcome. Point estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) for drought during the 
New Deal (1933-40) and prior that. All regressions include the standard set of controls: volunteering and casualty rate 
in WW1, log number of registrants in WW2, unemployment share in WW2, dummy for urban counties in 1930 and the 
mean share of votes for the Democratic party from 1896-1928. Outcome is share of volunteers in WW2.  
 
 
Figure 8b. Placebo for war bond outcome. Point estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) for drought during the New 
Deal (1933-40) and prior that. All regressions include the standard set of controls: volunteering and casualty rate in 
WW1, log number of registrants in WW2, unemployment share in WW2, dummy for urban counties in 1930 and the 





Figure 8c. Placebo for war medal outcome. Point estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) for drought during the New 
Deal (1933-40) and prior that. All regressions include the standard set of controls: volunteering and casualty rate in 
WW1, log number of registrants in WW2, unemployment share in WW2, dummy for urban counties in 1930 and the 
mean share of votes for the Democratic party from 1896-1928. Outcome is war medals per registrant in WW2. We 






Figure 9. Effect of welfare spending (by type) on a profession's share among volunteers. All regressions control for a 



















Figure 10a: Results with and without entropy balancing for volunteering. Treated counties are counties with above 
median welfare spending. We use the standard set of controls for rebalancing and as a control (in the +control 
specifications): volunteering and casualty rate in WW1, log number of registrants in WW2, unemployment share in 




Figure 10b. Results with and without entropy balancing for bonds. Treated counties are counties with above median 
welfare spending. We use the standard set of controls for rebalancing and as a control (in the +control specifications): 
volunteering and casualty rate in WW1, log number of registrants in WW2, unemployment share in WW2, dummy for 
urban counties in 1930 and the mean share of votes for the Democratic party from 1896-1928. 
 
Figure 10c. Results with and without entropy balancing for war medals. Treated counties are counties with above 
median welfare spending. We use the standard set of controls for rebalancing and as a control (in the +control 
specifications): volunteering and casualty rate in WW1, log number of registrants in WW2, unemployment share in 
WW2, dummy for urban counties in 1930 and the mean share of votes for the Democratic party from 1896-1928. 
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 TABLES  
World War II variables Mean St. dev. Observations 
1944 war bond purchases per capita 67.23 68.72 2'846 
World War II army registrants 2'824 8'253 2'240 
World War II army volunteers 498 1'559 2'240 
Share of World War II army volunteers 0.177 0.081 2'240 
Number of World War II military awards 1.081 3.143 2'240 
Number of World War II military awards per 1000 soldiers 0.433 0.744 2'240 
World War II volunteers: 1942 192 694 2'240 
Share of World War II volunteers: 1942 0.165 0.104 2'240 
    New Deal variables Mean St. dev. Observations 
New Deal grants per capita 149 138 2'846 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants per farmer 430 1'203 2'846 
Other New Deal grants per capita 106 118 2'846 
    Weather variable Mean St. dev. Observations 
Number of months with a severe drought: 1933-1939 6.994 8.314 2'846 
    County controls Mean St. dev. Observations 
Share of World War I volunteers: 1917 0.352 0.252 2'846 
World War I medal (dummy) 0.622 0.485 2'846 
World War I casualty rate 0.060 0.038 2'846 
Unemployment rate: 1930 0.059 0.040 2'846 
Unemployment rate: 1940 0.073 0.037 2'846 
Urban county: 1930 (dummy) 0.561 0.496 2'846 
Average Democratic vote: 1896-1928 0.493 0.188 2'846 
 Table 1. Summary statistics. 
 
Dep. var.: log 1944 war bond purchases per capita World War II volunteering rate World War II medals per 1000 soldiers 
             
log New Deal grants p.c. 0.487*** 0.505*** 0.366***  0.041*** 0.029*** 0.012***  0.153*** 0.129*** 0.069*  
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.025)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.035) (0.038) (0.042)  
log AAA grants per farmer    0.188***    0.009***    0.051*** 
    (0.014)    (0.001)    (0.018) 
log other grants p.c.    0.157***    0.005**    0.023 
    (0.022)    (0.002)    (0.032) 
log WWII registrants  0.085*** 0.143*** 0.147***  -0.015*** -0.002 -0.001  -0.063*** -0.040** -0.037** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
1917 volunteering rate  0.196*** 0.135*** 0.121***  0.002 0.012** 0.012**  0.104 0.105 0.105 
  (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.070) (0.072) (0.072) 
WWI medal  -0.006 -0.039* -0.067***  0.003 0.001 -0.001  0.059 0.052 0.043 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
WWI casualty rate  0.169 -0.751*** -0.535*  0.210*** 0.020 0.035  0.358 0.065 0.163 
  (0.283) (0.269) (0.288)  (0.053) (0.038) (0.038)  (0.444) (0.489) (0.494) 
1940 unemployment rate  -2.392*** -2.317*** -0.959***  0.005 0.080* 0.138***  -0.661 -0.832* -0.440 
  (0.336) (0.329) (0.343)  (0.041) (0.042) (0.044)  (0.436) (0.452) (0.462) 
Urban status 1930  0.328*** 0.277*** 0.224***  0.046*** 0.023*** 0.020***  0.107*** 0.076* 0.062 
  (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Share Democrats 1896-1928  -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.004***  -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -5.274*** -5.599***   -0.016 0.148***   -0.287* 0.291   
 (0.095) (0.178)   (0.016) (0.027)   (0.160) (0.220)   
             
Service command F.E. (9)             
Observations 2,913 2,913 2,913 2,913 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 
R-squared 0.174 0.369 0.446 0.463 0.075 0.183 0.505 0.511 0.012 0.025 0.036 0.038 
 
Table 2.  World War II volunteering rate patriotic support. Robust standard errors in parentheses,* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Regressions on columns 5 through 12 exclude the 





Panel A. Unconditional correlations. 












        
log months of drought 1933-1939 -0.325*** -0.000 -0.039*** 0.002 0.003*** -0.005 -3.885*** 
 (0.032) (0.007) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.515) 
        
R2 0.058 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.023 
        
Panel B. Correlation within service command. 












log months of drought 1933-1939 -0.246*** -0.001 0.015 0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.622 
 (0.038) (0.008) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.474) 
        
Service command Fes        
R2 0.163 0.062 0.069 0.152 0.148 0.047 0.503 
Observations 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 
 
Table 3. Balancedness: New Deal-era droughts and pre-existing characteristics of the county. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models use 
service command fixed effects. Dependent variables are (in that order) log of population in 1930, share of volunteers in WW1, death rate among soldiers in WW1, unemployment rate 





Dep. var.: log Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants per farmer 
    
log months of drought 1933-1939 0.727*** 0.681*** 0.466*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) 
log WWII registrants  -0.187*** -0.092*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) 
1917 volunteering rate  0.080 0.049 
  (0.073) (0.071) 
WWI medal  0.065 0.090** 
  (0.041) (0.040) 
WWI casualty rate  -2.134*** -2.433*** 
  (0.640) (0.672) 
1940 unemployment rate  -5.748*** -6.369*** 
  (0.521) (0.549) 
Urban status 1930  0.257*** 0.176*** 
  (0.046) (0.045) 
Share Democrats 1896-1928  0.008*** 0.009*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 4.154*** 5.429***  
 (0.040) (0.205)  
    
Service command F.E. (9)    
Observations 2,913 2,913 2,913 
R-squared 0.299 0.390 0.452 
F-test of excluded instrument 1265 819 252 
 
Table 4. First stage: New Deal-era droughts and Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants. 
Standardized beta coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is log agricultural grants per farmer. Our instrument is log months of drought from 1933-39. * p < .1, ** 










Dep. var.: log 1944 war bond purchases per capita World War II volunteering rate World War II medals per 1000 soldiers 
          
log months of drought 
1933-1939 0.260*** 0.264*** 0.213*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.016*** 0.130*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) 
log WWII registrants  0.204*** 0.140***  0.002 0.011**  0.104 0.101 
  (0.043) (0.041)  (0.007) (0.005)  (0.070) (0.071) 
1917 volunteering rate  -0.046* -0.069***  0.001 -0.001  0.051 0.042 
  (0.024) (0.023)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.038) (0.039) 
WWI medal  -0.050 -0.955***  0.222*** 0.016  0.394 0.038 
  (0.299) (0.283)  (0.054) (0.038)  (0.449) (0.495) 
WWI casualty rate  0.103*** 0.153***  -0.010*** -0.000  -0.048*** -0.029 
  (0.014) (0.014)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.018) (0.018) 
1940 unemployment rate  -0.563* -1.306***  0.106*** 0.122***  -0.198 -0.579 
  (0.339) (0.325)  (0.041) (0.043)  (0.407) (0.429) 
Urban status 1930  0.261*** 0.228***  0.039*** 0.020***  0.084** 0.060 
  (0.029) (0.026)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.041) (0.041) 
Share Democrats 1896-
1928  -0.010*** -0.002***  -0.001*** -0.000***  -0.002** -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -3.368*** -3.757***  0.124*** 0.197***  0.252*** 0.630***  
 (0.027) (0.117)  (0.003) (0.018)  (0.029) (0.158)  
          
Service command F.E.s          
Observations 2,913 2,913 2,913 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 
R-squared 0.123 0.317 0.423 0.127 0.225 0.514 0.017 0.028 0.040 
 
Table 5. Reduced form: New Deal-era droughts and World War II patriotic support. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reduced form results. Columns 1-3 show results using log 
war bond sales per capita as dependent variable. Columns 4-6 use volunteer share in WW2 and columns 7-9 medals per 1000 soldiers as dependent variable. Constant is omitted from 
regression table. 








Dep. var.: log 1944 war bond purchases per capita World War II volunteering rate World War II medals per 1000 soldiers 
          
log AAA grants per farmer 0.358*** 0.388*** 0.456*** 0.062*** 0.050*** 0.038*** 0.211*** 0.167*** 0.245*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.040) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.039) (0.037) (0.070) 
log WWII registrants  0.173*** 0.118**  0.005 0.013**  0.117* 0.113 
  (0.045) (0.046)  (0.007) (0.006)  (0.071) (0.073) 
1917 volunteering rate  -0.071*** -0.110***  -0.002 -0.005*  0.040 0.011 
  (0.025) (0.026)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.039) (0.042) 
WWI medal  0.778** 0.156  0.343*** 0.105**  0.801* 0.614 
  (0.346) (0.408)  (0.064) (0.048)  (0.482) (0.571) 
WWI casualty rate  0.175*** 0.195***  -0.002 0.002  -0.023 -0.012 
  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.020) (0.019) 
1940 unemployment rate  1.668*** 1.601***  0.310*** 0.350***  0.487 0.895 
  (0.370) (0.427)  (0.050) (0.061)  (0.448) (0.632) 
Urban status 1930  0.161*** 0.147***  0.023*** 0.013***  0.033 0.011 
  (0.031) (0.031)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.045) (0.046) 
Share Democrats 1896-1928  -0.013*** -0.007***  -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.004*** -0.004** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -4.854*** -5.865***  -0.138*** -0.047  -0.642*** -0.190  
 (0.107) (0.225)  (0.024) (0.034)  (0.195) (0.266)  
          
Service command F.E.s          
Observations 2,913 2,913 2,913 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 
 
Table 6: Two stage least squares: Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants and World War II patriotic support. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1-3 show results using log war bond sales per capita as dependent variable. Columns 4-6 use volunteer share in WW2 and columns 7-9 
medals per 1000 soldiers as dependent variable. Constant is omitted from regression table.  








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Farmer/Vol Farmer/Vol Farmer/Vol Farmer/Vol Farmer/Vol Farmer/Vol Farmer/Vol Farmer/Vol Farmer/Vol Farmer/Vol 
log-Agri_Grants 
per farmer 
0.0315*** 0.0337*** 0.0254*** 0.0248*** 0.0136***      
 (0.00226) (0.00232) (0.00253) (0.00254) (0.00236)      
Log other relief 
per capita 
     -0.0416*** -0.0413*** -0.0435*** -0.0431*** -0.00391 
      (0.00489) (0.00499) (0.00495) (0.00497) (0.00522) 
Vol-WW1    -0.0590*** -0.00236    -0.0546*** -0.00127 
    (0.0114) (0.0101)    (0.0114) (0.0101) 
FarmerDraft/Soldi
er 
 0.0678*** 0.0633*** 0.0687***   -0.00158 0.0307** 0.0371***  
  (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0132)   (0.0130) (0.0139) (0.0138)  
Farmers40-PC     1.405***     1.455*** 
     (0.0641)     (0.0716) 
Service Command 
FE  
No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 2292 2288 2288 2248 2237 2309 2305 2305 2262 2250 
 
Table 7: Effect of agricultural spending on farmers. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is the share of farmer volunteers over all volunteers in a county. Variable 
FarmerDraft/Soldiers is the share of drafted farmers over all soldiers and therefore aims to control for the local labor market structure. Farmers40-PC is the share of farmers over all 
citizens in the 1940 census. Log other relief per capita is total grants minus agricultural grants. Constant is omitted from regression table. 
























Democrat9628       42.96      217.9      .9683       42.96      250.1      .6657 
   Urban1930       .5312      .2492      -.125       .5312      .2492      -.125 
   Unemp1940       .0788    .001644      1.073       .0788    .002452      1.911 
logRegistr~2       6.589      1.527      .7571       6.589      1.294     -.7295 
 CasualtyWW1      .06396    .001539      1.549      .06396    .002018      1.656 
 AnyAwardWW1       .6032      .2395     -.4217       .6031      .2395     -.4217 
      VolWW1       .3739     .06934      .8916       .3739     .07836      .8515 
                                                                                 
                    mean   variance   skewness        mean   variance   skewness 
                            Treat                            Control             
After:  _webal as the weighting variable
Democrat9628       42.96      217.9      .9683       55.46        394       .243 
   Urban1930       .5312      .2492      -.125       .5897      .2421     -.3648 
   Unemp1940       .0788    .001644      1.073      .06419    .001254      1.201 
logRegistr~2       6.589      1.527      .7571       7.144      .9981      .4834 
 CasualtyWW1      .06396    .001539      1.549      .05587    .001349      1.341 
 AnyAwardWW1       .6032      .2395     -.4217       .6439      .2295     -.6009 
      VolWW1       .3739     .06934      .8916       .3314     .05791      1.024 
                                                                                 
                    mean   variance   skewness        mean   variance   skewness 
                            Treat                            Control             
Before: without weighting
Control units: 1477    total of weights: 1459
Treated units: 1459    total of weights: 1459
 
Table A1. Entropy balancing. Results show difference in covariates between above and below median welfare recipient counties before and after weighting. Variables correspond to 




  no of matches 
   dependent variable 3 8  12 3 8  12 3 8  12 
Volunteer Share WW2 0.005 0.009* 0.010** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)     
Log per capita war bonds 
1944  0.099
** 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.352*** 0.367*** 0.382*** 0.156*** 0.195*** 0.223*** 
    (0.038) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028)     
Medals per soldier WW2 -0.045 -0.027 -0.030 0.055 0.095** 0.106** 0.021 0.030 0.049 
    (0.082) (0.070) (0.067) (0.054) (0.047) (0.046) (0.061) (0.054) (0.051) 
Longitude    
   
   
Latitude     
   
   
Log population 1940           
Controls 
   
      
 
 
Table A2. Results from nearest neighbor matching. We show results for our three outcomes volunteering, log purchase of war bonds and medals per soldier in WW2. We match 3, 8 or 
12 counties respectively and display the average treatment effects of the treatment variable “above median log total grants per capita”. We match by longitude, latitude, log population 
in 1940 and the standard set of controls: volunteering and casualty rate in WW1, log number of registrants in WW2, unemployment share in WW2, dummy for urban counties in 1930 
and the mean share of votes for the Democratic party from 1896-1928. 





Dep. var.: World War II volunteers / 1930 population log World War II volunteers 1942 volunteering rate 
             
log New Deal grants p.c. 2.379*** 2.453*** 1.680***  0.264**
* 
0.184*** 0.082***  0.052*** 0.051*** 0.032***  
 (0.262) (0.283) (0.315)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)  
log AAA grants per farmer    0.691***    0.048***    0.022*** 
    (0.117)    (0.008)    (0.002) 
log other grants p.c.    1.177***    0.052***    0.015*** 
    (0.262)    (0.014)    (0.004) 
log WWII registrants  1.028** 1.237** 1.231** 1.032*** 0.941*** 1.008*** 1.010***  -0.004 0.006** 0.008*** 
  (0.466) (0.482) (0.482) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
1917 volunteering rate  1.670*** 1.664*** 1.615**  0.083** 0.131*** 0.129***  0.017* 0.023*** 0.023*** 
  (0.620) (0.631) (0.628)  (0.034) (0.027) (0.026)  (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
WWI medal  -1.022* -0.769 -0.868  0.008 0.010 0.003  -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 
  (0.597) (0.590) (0.597)  (0.019) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
WWI casualty rate  7.053 11.028* 11.532*  1.309*** 0.510** 0.572**  0.072 -0.060 -0.022 
  (5.397) (6.460) (6.493)  (0.303) (0.227) (0.226)  (0.060) (0.058) (0.057) 
1940 unemployment rate  6.276 6.571 9.534*  0.323 0.555** 0.819***  -0.163*** -0.167*** -0.013 
  (5.746) (5.298) (5.220)  (0.251) (0.257) (0.267)  (0.052) (0.054) (0.055) 
Urban status 1930  0.836** 0.413 0.235  0.251*** 0.130*** 0.118***  0.056*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 
  (0.332) (0.320) (0.327)  (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Share Democrats 1896-
1928 
 0.001 -0.023*** -0.029***  -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003***  -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 





-2.299*** -2.399*** -2.440*** -0.079*** -0.055 -0.028 -0.041 
 (1.283) (3.482) (4.017) (4.012) (0.122) (0.142) (0.114) (0.104) (0.022) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029) 
             
Service command F.E. (9)             
Observations 2,226 2,226 2,226 2,226 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 
R-squared 0.033 0.079 0.123 0.125 0.873 0.892 0.931 0.931 0.072 0.145 0.274 0.298 
 
Table A3. Alternative definitions of volunteering: New Deal spending and World War II volunteering rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses, Columns 1-4 use volunteers per 
capita as an outcome. Columns 5-8 use log-volunteers as an outcome and columns 9-12 look at the share of volunteers among the 1942 cohort. Constant is omitted from regression 
table.  





Dep. var.: World War II volunteers / 1930 population log World War II volunteers 1942 volunteering rate 
          
log months of drought 1933-1939 1.187*** 1.533*** 1.295*** 0.224*** 0.170*** 0.077*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.032*** 
 (0.172) (0.173) (0.186) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
log WWII registrants  1.161** 1.340*** 1.054*** 0.967*** 1.015***  0.003 0.009*** 
  (0.479) (0.491) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)  (0.003) (0.003) 
1917 volunteering rate  1.690*** 1.617**  0.082** 0.128***  0.017* 0.021*** 
  (0.645) (0.648)  (0.034) (0.027)  (0.009) (0.008) 
WWI medal  -1.155* -0.900  -0.003 0.002  -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.600) (0.597)  (0.019) (0.016)  (0.005) (0.004) 
WWI casualty rate  7.568 10.873*  1.373*** 0.493**  0.088 -0.067 
  (5.455) (6.478)  (0.312) (0.231)  (0.060) (0.057) 
1940 unemployment rate  15.469*** 12.108**  0.973*** 0.819***  0.019 -0.062 
  (5.408) (4.975)  (0.248) (0.263)  (0.051) (0.054) 
Urban status 1930  0.546 0.206  0.211*** 0.118***  0.046*** 0.032*** 
  (0.336) (0.331)  (0.021) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Share Democrats 1896-1928  0.000 -0.022**  -0.004*** -0.003***  -0.000*** -0.000 
  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 8.236*** -2.283  -2.524*** -1.899***  0.104*** 0.070***  
 (0.331) (2.999)  (0.069) (0.092)  (0.004) (0.023)  
          
Service command F.E.s          
Observations 2,226 2,226 2,226 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 
R-squared 0.016 0.074 0.124 0.878 0.896 0.931 0.102 0.173 0.288 
 
Table A4. Alternative definitions of volunteering: New Deal-era droughts and World War II volunteering rate. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1-3 use volunteers per capita as 
an outcome. Columns 4-6 use log number of volunteers as an outcome. Columns 7-9 use the share of volunteers (over registrants) in the 1942 cohort. Constant is omitted from 
regression table. 








Dep. var.: World War II volunteers / 1930 population log World War II volunteers 1942 volunteering rate 
          
log AAA grants per farmer 1.936*** 2.456*** 3.032*** 0.397*** 0.273*** 0.180*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 
 (0.288) (0.279) (0.463) (0.029) (0.021) (0.030) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
log WWII registrants  1.542*** 1.542*** 1.108*** 1.009*** 1.027***  0.013*** 0.014*** 
  (0.501) (0.506) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)  (0.003) (0.003) 
1917 volunteering rate  1.897*** 1.781***  0.103*** 0.137***  0.022** 0.025*** 
  (0.650) (0.671)  (0.037) (0.029)  (0.010) (0.010) 
WWI medal  -1.319** -1.281**  -0.021 -0.020  -0.011** -0.015*** 
  (0.613) (0.631)  (0.021) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.005) 
WWI casualty rate  13.391** 17.786**  2.036*** 0.917***  0.256*** 0.112 
  (5.892) (7.191)  (0.359) (0.264)  (0.074) (0.080) 
1940 unemployment rate  25.202*** 29.787***  2.091*** 1.904***  0.304*** 0.396*** 
  (5.192) (5.043)  (0.296) (0.344)  (0.062) (0.088) 
Urban status 1930  -0.213 -0.410  0.128*** 0.082***  0.025*** 0.016** 
  (0.375) (0.387)  (0.025) (0.020)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Share Democrats 1896-1928  -0.032*** -0.063***  -0.008*** -0.005***  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.007) (0.011)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.016 -14.262***  -4.627*** -3.237***  -0.200*** -0.271***  
 (1.551) (3.918)  (0.211) (0.174)  (0.030) (0.046)  
          
Service command F.E.s          
Observations 2,226 2,226 2,226 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 
 
Table A5. Alternative definitions of volunteering: two-stages least squares. New Deal spending and World War II volunteering rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses Columns 1-3 
use volunteers per capita as an outcome. Columns 4-6 use log number of volunteers as an outcome. Columns 7-9 use the share of volunteers (over registrants) in the 1942 cohort. 







































           
log AAA grants per farmer  0.136*** 0.005*** 0.031     0.454*** 0.052*** 0.223 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.020)     (0.072) (0.011) (0.138) 
log other grants p.c. 0.140*** 0.004* -0.017        
 (0.026) (0.002) (0.036)        
log months of drought 1933-1939    0.300*** 0.136*** 0.015*** 0.063*    
    (0.032) (0.020) (0.003) (0.038)    
log WWII registrants 0.159*** -0.000 -0.030 -0.090*** 0.158*** 0.001 -0.028 0.199*** 0.005** -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.002) (0.020) (0.025) (0.015) (0.002) (0.020) (0.019) (0.002) (0.024) 
1917 volunteering rate 0.087** 0.023*** 0.135* 0.081 0.108*** 0.023*** 0.137* 0.072 0.018*** 0.113 
 (0.041) (0.005) (0.079) (0.068) (0.041) (0.005) (0.079) (0.047) (0.006) (0.078) 
WWI medal -0.040* 0.005** 0.019 0.008 -0.040* 0.006** 0.023 -0.044* 0.005 0.019 
 (0.021) (0.002) (0.041) (0.037) (0.022) (0.002) (0.041) (0.025) (0.003) (0.042) 
WWI casualty rate -0.198 0.048 -0.035 -1.866*** -0.453 0.040 -0.096 0.394 0.149*** 0.375 
 (0.284) (0.036) (0.548) (0.675) (0.279) (0.037) (0.550) (0.416) (0.056) (0.638) 
1940 unemployment rate -1.505*** 0.085** -0.780 -5.304*** -1.659*** 0.080* -0.970** 0.749 0.332*** 0.120 
 (0.322) (0.041) (0.509) (0.518) (0.310) (0.041) (0.480) (0.522) (0.075) (0.844) 
Urban status 1930 0.187*** 0.019*** 0.061 0.148*** 0.186*** 0.018*** 0.063 0.118*** 0.009** 0.022 
 (0.023) (0.003) (0.042) (0.041) (0.024) (0.003) (0.042) (0.031) (0.004) (0.053) 
Share Democrats 1896-1928 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.015*** 0.002* -0.000** 0.000 -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
Constant -5.866*** 0.062*** 0.372 4.986*** -4.755*** 0.090*** 0.399* -7.019*** -0.162*** -0.692 
 (0.205) (0.019) (0.272) (0.255) (0.148) (0.015) (0.211) (0.416) (0.061) (0.707) 
           
State F.E.           
Observations 2,913 2,240 2,240 2,913 2,913 2,240 2,240 2,913 2,240 2,240 
R-squared 0.557 0.654 0.059 0.561 0.536 0.658 0.059 0.391 0.416 0.013 
F-test of excluded instrument    86       
 
Table A6. Results including state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1-4 report ols estimates. Column 5 displays the first stage results. Columns 6-7 display 
reduced form results and columns 8-9 finally display second stage results. Columns headed by “Bonds” use log sales of warbonds per capita as outcome. Columns headed by WW2 Vol 




World War II variables 
1944 war bond purchases per capita. Value of 1944 war bond purchases from (ICPSR, 2012). We 
divide by 1940 population (King et al., 2010) and take the natural logarithm.  
Share of WW2 volunteers. We divide the number of volunteers in WW2 in the army by the number of 
army soldiers (draftees + volunteers) in each county (NARA, 2002)  
Share of WW2 volunteers in 1942. We divide the number of volunteers in 1942 in the army by the 
number of army soldiers (draftees + volunteers) in each county in 1942 (NARA, 2002). 
Number of WW2 awards by 1000 soldiers. Take the number of army awards in each county and 
divide by total number of army soldiers (draftees + volunteers) in each county. Multiply with 1000 
(NARA, 2002). We winsorize the 1% tail of the distribution. 
Log WW2 registrants. Natural logarithm of the total number of army soldiers (draftees + volunteers) 
in each county (NARA, 2002). 
Farmer-Volunteers/Volunteers. The share of volunteers in WW2 that are also farmers. This is coded 
up in the exact same way for each profession. We assign occupations to soldiers using the DOT codes 
provided (NARA, 2002).  
Farmer-Draftee/Draftees. The share of draftees in WW2 that are also farmers. This is coded up in the 
exact same way for each profession. We assign occupations to soldiers using the DOT codes provided 
(NARA, 2002). 
 
World War I variables 
Share of WW1 volunteers. We divide the number of volunteers until 1917 and divide it by the 
number of army soldiers (draftees + volunteers) in each county until 1917 (Provost, 1918) 
WW1 Medal. Dummy whether county was home to at least one soldier that was awarded a medal in 
WW1 (homeofheroes.com) 
WW1 Casualty Rate. Number of casualties in a county (Haulsee, 1920) divided by the number of 
soldiers (Provost, 1918).  
 
New Deal  
Log total grants per capita. Natural logarithm of total non-repayable grants (Fishback et al, 2003) 




Log Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) grants per farmer. Natural logarithm of AAA 
grants (Fishback et al, 2003) divided by total number of farmers in 1930 (King et al., 2010). 
Log other grants per capita. Natural logarithm of other grants (total grants – AAA grants) divided by 
total population in 1930. 
 
Weather 
Log drought in 1933-39. National Climatic Data Center provides a panel of 176 climate division for 
the continental US since 1900. We assign each county to a climate division and count the number of 
months with severe drought in each year. Severe drought is here defined as having a Palmer Drought 
Severity Index of -3 or lower. We then continue and aggregate the total number of months with severe 
drought for the time span of the New Deal (1933-39) and take the natural logarithm of this number.  
 
Other controls 
Unemployment rate 1930/1940. We use the 100% census from IPUMS (King et al, 2012) to compute 
this. We divide the number of unemployed in the respective year by the labor force (total population – 
# not in labor force). 
Average Democratic vote: 1896-1928. We take this from Fishback et al (2003). It is the mean share of 
votes cast in favor of the democratic party from 1896-1928 in presidential elections. 
Urban county: 1930 (dummy). 1 if urban population is greater than 0 in 1930 (King et al, 2012). 
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